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DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT 
UNDER STONE AND VINSON, 1941-1953. By Melvin I. 
Urofsky. 1 University of South Carolina Press. 1997. Pp. 
xv, 298. $39.95 cloth; $21.95 paperback. 
L.A. Powe, Jr. 2 
If either a colleague or a student asked me to recommend a 
book on the Supreme Court between the Court-packing crisis 
and the Warren years, I would unhesitatingly select Melvin I. 
Urofsky's Division and Discord. Part of the University of South 
Carolina Press series on the Chief Justiceships of the United 
States Supreme Court, Division and Discord admirably describes 
the justices and the cases of the Stone (1941-46) and Vinson 
(1946-53) Courts/ emphasizing it was an era of transition from 
the old order to the Warren Court. 
Never does naming a Court after its chief justice look sillier 
than during this era, and Urofsky knows it. Thus he focuses on 
the major players, Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter, primarily, 
and William 0. Douglas and Robert H. Jackson, secondarily. 
These major intellects-attached to huge egos-were simply too 
much for Harlan Fiske Stone and, especially, Fred Vinson to 
keep calm, much less tame.4 The book opens with an excellent 
chapter on the men, their personalities, and their battles-both 
jurisprudential and personal. In that era, the Court was filled 
with men with broad and extensive public service (rather than 
simply experience on a court of appeals), and the justices were 
able to write their own opinions (rather than delegate them to 
twenty-seven year-old law review alums).5 
!. Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University. 
2. Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texas School of Law. This re-
view was commissioned in the summer of 2000 for the paperback edition. _ ed. 
3. When Fred Vinson took his scat, the Court became the youngest in American 
history and the least experienced once experience had become possible. David N. Atkin-
son, Leaving the Bench: Supreme Court Justice atthe End 191 (U. Press of Kansas, 1999). 
4. "In part, as we shall see, the force of Frankfurter's views led Black and Douglas 
to develop an opposing jurisprudence, and in the clash of those ideas, first Harlan Stone 
and then Fred Vinson could do little more than try to keep the conferences from explod-
ing." (pp. 32-33) 
5. Until the 1947 Term the justices also had but a single clerk; then all except 
Douglas went to two. L.A. Powe, Jr., Go Geezers Go: Leaving the Bench, 25 Law & So-
cial Inquiry 1227, 1238 (2000). 
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Black and Frankfurter were strong advocates and ceaseless 
proselytizers who took losing hard and personally. Both shared 
the New Deal revulsion at the old order. Their conflict brought 
out the best in each other as each created a jurisprudence that 
was intended to limit judicial discretion. 
Black came to the Court with a strong populist record in the 
Senate, and his populism continued on the Court, where he 
found a jurisprudential style that fit his views. He saw the Con-
stitution as a Protestant document to be read and understood ac-
cording to its original intent. It turned out that (in Black's read-
ing of history) the Framers had populist views, too, nicely 
matching his own. His demand that the First Amendment be in-
terpreted literally and the Fourteenth Amendment be deemed to 
incorporate the Bill of Rights counterbalanced Frankfurter's 
view that all constitutional provisions save one6 be interpreted 
with a deferential reasonableness standard. 
Frankfurter brought with him enormous experience and the 
not unreasonable view that he was the intellectual heir to 
Holmes and Brandeis and therefore the natural leader of the 
Court. It just didn't work out that way. As Urofsky shows, had 
Frankfurter displayed better (any?) interpersonal skills, he might 
well have been more persuasive within the Conference.7 In-
stead, his "rage at the failure of the other justices to follow his 
lead often turned splenetic." (p. 34) Because he knew so much 
about both the Court and constitutional law, he believed reason-
able men could not differ with him; instead they were "the 
Axis"8 - "enemies." (p. 40) Frankfurter never understood how 
his notes and diaries would read to those who did not know and 
like him personally, and Urofsky consistently lets Frankfurter 
hang himself with his own words. 
The Douglas of this era is not as ascerbic, as liberal,9 or as 
much a soloist, as the Warren era Douglas was. Instead he is a 
younger10 man wanting to get back to the Executive Branch, 
6. The Establishment Clause. Frankfurter dissented in both Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), and concurred in 
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). These Establishment Clause opinions 
stand in very stark contrast to Frankfurter's general jurisprudential approach as well as in 
complete opposition to his views on federalism. 
7. He seemed to enjoy going after Frank Murphy in the same way that some chil-
dren tum turtles on their backs. 
8. Black, Douglas, and Frank Murphy. (p. 40) 
9. L.A. Powe, Jr., Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amend-
ment, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 371 (1974). 
10. I guess I have to note that Urofsky mistakenly makes Douglas the youngest ap-
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preferably as FDR's successor. 11 Until the domestic security 
cases arise, Douglas looks like the center of the Court, albeit 
more liberal on business regulation and federalism 12 and more 
conservative in the wartime disloyalty cases. 13 With the excep-
tion of his creativity in Skinner, 14 Douglas plays a strong second-
fiddle to the Hugo Black who was like a needed older brother. 
If for no other reason, this book would be welcome because 
it necessarily reminds us what fun it can be to read a Jackson 
opinion. They are just delights; perhaps he was fortunate in 
never completing law school-the last such Justice in our history. 
His time on the Court was nevertheless marred by his ambitions 
and his conflicts with the equally combative Black. Jackson be-
lieved that FDR's promise that he would be Chief Justice (p. 9) 
should have been fulfilled by Truman; he went to Nuremberg as 
chief American prosecutor and then blew up when Truman se-
lected Vinson for the center seat (pp. 140-45) (a position clearly 
necessitated by the public battle over whether Black should have 
participated in the portal-to-portal case15 where he cast the de-
ciding vote). 
While the Stone and Vinson Courts were consolidating the 
New Deal revolution and initiating protection of civil rights and 
civil liberties, their dominant motif was war, World War II for 
Stone, the Cold War for Vinson. In his preface Urofsky states 
pointee ever. (p. 23) That honor is Joseph Story's; William Johnson holds second place, 
and Douglas is in third, the youngest of the twentieth century. 
11. Nevertheless, he turned down Truman's offer of the vice-presidency in 1948, 
probably on the assumption that Truman could not win. His rejection of Truman was not 
gracious, either, since he still fumed at Truman's luck in 1944 and quipped to Senator 
Burton Wheeler that he wouldn't be a number two man to a number two man. James F. 
Simon, Independent Journey: The Life of William 0. Douglas 274 (Harper & Row, 1980). 
The quip came back to Truman, and he was not amused. 
12. But see his dissent in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), which 
leads to his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), and would place him in 
harmony with the "new federalism" decisions of the Rehnquist Court. Go figure; I've 
tried and haven't been able to. 
13. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 
680 (1944); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945); Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 
631 (1947). 
14. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
15. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 
(1945), extended the Fair Labor Standards Act to the time the miners entered the mine 
rather than when they started work. Congress overturned the decision. The UMW at-
torney had formerly been a partner of Black's, hence the issue of recusal on a petition for 
rehearing Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 897 (1945). Black and 
Jackson eventually made up, which is far more than Douglas and Frankfurter ever did 
with their feud (which seems personality-driven in the extreme). 
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that with the exception of the JaRanese internmene 6 and Nazi 
saboteur17 cases and then Dennis, "this is not an era that grabs 
the observer's attention." (p. xiii) He may undersell his era. To 
pick three cases, one everyone knows, one most know, and one 
that virtually all have forgotten-and all with an opinion by 
Jackson-consider: (1) What constitutional law student ever for-
gets Farmer Filburn's wheat? 19 (2) West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette20 is as good as any opinion in the United 
States Reports. (3) And the Court's absurd results when con-
fronting quickie21 Nevada divorces (at a time the other 47 states 
required cause) deserves to be remembered and laughed at.22 
As usual Jackson's pen helps: the Court's judgment "permits 
[Herbert] Rice to have a wife who cannot become his widow and 
to leave a widow who was no longer his wife. "23 (p. 136) 
There is no way to undo the Court's performance with the 
Japanese internment. The best that can be said is that Franklin 
Roosevelt and Earl Warren-not to mention John McCloy in 
the War Departmene4-come off worse. Perhaps if Black and 
Douglas had been further along in their careers or the president 
had been someone more like Nixon or Clinton, the Court could 
have declared the internment unconstitutional. But those are ifs 
16. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
17. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Frankfurter, who was in intense consulta-
tions with the War Department over what to do with the captured saboteurs, did not 
recuse himself. (pp. 60-61) 
18. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
19. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
20. 319 u.s. 624 (1943). 
21. Six weeks in residence plus an intent to stay at least as long as necessary to get 
the first available transportation home. 
22. That's Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), and Williams v. North 
Carolina 325 U.S. 226 (1945), where two North Carolinians, each with a twenty-year 
marriage became new Nevadans when they made their "domicile" at the Alamo Auto 
Court in Las Vegas. Williams I overturned their bigamous cohabitation convictions be-
cause North Carolina had to give full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce; Williams II 
held the conviction was valid because North Carolina could decide for itself whether the 
divorced and then married couple had in fact established a Nevada domicile. Stone, 
Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, and Murphy joined each majority. 
23. Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 680 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). The issue was 
inheritance because Herbert died intestate. Like Otis Williams and Lillie Hendrix of 
Williams fame, he was ending a twenty-year marriage. But there were some distinctions 
from Williams: Hermoine, Herbert's new wife, did not accompany him and came to Reno 
for their marriage some three weeks after his divorce; and the pair never returned to 
Connecticut, Herbert dying some six months into the marriage. Jackson, who had been 
adamant that Williams and Hendrix had not acquired a Nevada domicile, quite reasona-
bly believed that Rice had. Black, Douglas, and Rutledge also dissented. 
24. Sec generally Peter Irons, Justice at War (Oxford U. Press, 1983) (discussing the 
Japanese-American internment and the Supreme Court cases that validated it). 
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that did not happen. If one can exclude the inexcusable, then 
the Court, like the federal government in general, performed 
well during World War II. "[I]ts views on defining treason, de-
naturalization, the precedence of civilian courts, and freedom 
from an imposed flag salute have become staples in American 
constitutional law." (p. 84) 
Amazingly, the Japanese internment excluded again, the 
Court performed far better with respect to civil liberties during 
World War II than it did in the early Cold War. Whether it is 
Doudi5 or Dennis or the rush to see that the Rosenbergs were 
executed on schedule, (pp. 178-83) there is little to say for the 
Court beyond Black's closing note in Dennis: maybe in calmer 
times things will get better-as they eventually did some nine 
years after the Senate condemned Joe McCarthy.26 
The full chapter devoted to labor issues, including Truman's 
personal battles to keep the coal mines27 and the steel mills28 
working, is a clear indication that Stone's and Vinson's time was 
another era, when legislatively and judicially organized labor ini-
tially had a dominance and then the pendulum swung. The legis-
lative pendulum, with Republicans and the Taft-Hartley Act, is 
well known. But a lesser known judicial swing was at work, too, 
as the Court was unwilling both to apply Lochner analysis to 
anti-labor legislation and to extend First Amendment protec-
tions from peaceful picketing to coercive activities. In the end, 
labor may have demanded too much; at bottom, as Urofsky 
notes, none of the New Dealers was an across-the-board cham-
pion for labor (as most of them were for Roosevelt). (p. 212) 
The chapters on the rich Black-Frankfurter debate over in-
corporation and the meaning of due process as well as "The 
Road to Brown" cover well-known materials in a traditional 
manner. As is typical in the book, Urofsky's case analysis is ex-
cellent.29 
There is one case where I differ significantly from Urof-
sky-Everson.30 I think he too readily accepts Jefferson's famous 
Establishment Clause metaphor-that wall of separation be-
tween church and state-articulated by both its majority and dis-
25. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
26. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 154-56, 218-21, 
310-17 (Belknap Press, 2000). 
27. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). 
28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
29. His footnotes helpfully highlight the relevant secondary literature. 
30. Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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senters. In Black's words-and the dissenters' outcome-the 
"wall must be kept high and impregnable."31 While happily 
mentioning Europe's religious wars, Black was tying the Estab-
lishment Clause to the legal position articulated in but a single 
state (through its most articulate spokesman). 
Metaphor as constitutional doctrine, whatever its literary at-
traction, invites chaos,32 and the "wall of separation" has been 
under sustained attack now for two decades and not without rea-
son. The Everson justices were from an educated cohort for 
whom organized religion had acquired a bad name, and they 
lived in an intellectual milieu where intense anti-Catholicism was 
a given. Anti-Catholicism was a fully acceptable prejudice be-
cause it had been lifted from its bigoted KKK nature to an intel-
lectual and academic construce3 where the Catholic religion was 
seen as antithetical to democratic values and, indeed, positively 
conducive to fascism. 34 At least four35 of the justices-Black, 
Frankfurter, Rutledge, and Burton-were expressly aware of this 
anti-Catholic movement and favorably disposed toward it.36 It is 
inconceivable that it did not influence the rhetoric chosen to re-
ject the standard Catholic position of a union of church and 
state.37 With organized religion in better shape than in Everson's 
era (the former so-called "mainstream" Protestant denomina-
tions excepted) and anti-Catholicism a relic of pre-Vatican II, it 
is no wonder that Everson seems less a statement of eternal 
truths (or original intent) than simply a snapshot encapsulating 
the attitudes of a by-gone era. 
While I would have emphasized politics more, Urofsky's 
choices are all perfectly reasonable. He moves among opinions, 
31. Id. at 18. 
32. "Black's rhetoric in Everson was simultaneously inflammatory and unsustain· 
able." Powe, The Warren Court at 182 (cited in note 26). Using Holmes' "marketplace 
of ideas" metaphor as the foundation for First Amendment doctrine succeeds no better. 
33. Paul Blanshard, American Freedom and Catholic Power (Beacon Press, 1949). 
A Book-of-the-Month Club selection, it was widely and favorably reviewed in both aca-
demic journals and the popular press. 
34. John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intel-
lectual Imagination, 1928-1960, 84 J. Am. Hisl 97 (1997). 
35. I am certain Douglas should be added to the four. 
36. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 Emory 
L.J. 43,57 (1997). 
37. As late as 1962 (prior to the commencement of Vatican II but after the election 
of John Kennedy ), an article in Atlantic Magazine could note that many Americans 
were deeply distrustful of the Catholic church on the matter of church and state. Francis 
J. Lally, Points of Abrasion, 210 Atlantic 78 (August 1962). 
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the justices' internal papers, and secondary sources and succeeds 
in doing what he sets out to do. 
If I have a criticism, it is minor. Division and Discord is a 
whig history; that is, the book takes as a given what came after-
wards and attempts to show how the foundations-in this case 
for the Warren Court-were being laid. Yet the Warren Court 
was hardly inevitable. Warren himself could have continued to 
be the former prosecutor and governor, the Warren of Barsk/8 
and Irvine, 39 rather than the liberal icon so revered. Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell could have followed President Eisen-
hower's directive to find a conservative Catholic jurist instead of 
breaching it and choosing William J. Brennan. ° Felix Frank-
furter could have accepted President Kennedy's entreaties about 
retiring, and it would have been Paul Freund instead of Arthur 
Goldberg.41 On a more important level, if Martin Luther King, 
Jr., had not come up with his "children's crusade" in May 1963, 
he would have been defeated in Birmingham just as he had the 
previous year in Albany, Georgia,42 and the Civil Rights Act 
would have been delayed, with a chance for the constitutional 
doctrine that trespass statutes trumps peaceful demonstrations 
to become the law in the interim.43 In short, the Warren Court 
needed events to fall in particular ways, and worrying about 
whether prior Courts were a prelude necessarily ignores anum-
ber of contingencies. 
Yet, even though Urofsky has written a whig history, Divi-
sion and Discord does the Stone and Vinson Courts justice on 
their own terms. It is a book we all should have in our libraries. 
38. Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). 
39. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
40. Powe, The Warren Court at 89-90 (cited in note 26). 
41. Id. at 211. 
42. Id. at 223-25; Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 
1954-63 at 753, 756-802 (Simon & Schuster, 1988); David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 173-264 (Wil-
liam Morrow & Co., 1986); John Morton Blum, Years of Discord: American Politics and 
Society, 1961-1974 at 106 (W. W. Norton & Co., 1991). 
43. Black's majority coalition in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), had al-
ready come together in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). It took Brennan's heroic 
efforts and all his creativity to pull Tom Clark and Potter Stewart loose in order to re-
verse those sit-in convictions. Powc, The Warren Court at 227-29 (cited in note 26). 
